A

ACTOR NETWORK THEORY

Actor network theory (ANT), also known as enrolment theory or the sociology of translation, emerged during the mid-1980s, primarily with the work of Bruno Latour, Michel Callon, and John Law. ANT is a conceptual frame for exploring collective *sociotechnical* processes, whose spokespersons have paid particular attention to science and technologic activity. Stemming from a Science and Technologies Studies (STS) interest in the elevated status of scientific knowledge and counter to heroic accounts or innovation models, ANT suggests that the work of science is not fundamentally different from other social activities. ANT privileges neither natural (realism) nor cultural (social constructivism) accounts of scientific production, asserting instead that science is a process of heterogeneous engineering in which the social, technical, conceptual, and textual are puzzled together (or juxtaposed) and transformed (or translated).

As one of many anti-essentialist movements, ANT does not differentiate between science (knowledge) and technology (artifact). Similarly, proponents do not subscribe to the division between society and nature, truth and falsehood, agency and structure, context and content, human and nonhuman, microlevel phenomenon and macrolevel phenomenon, or knowledge and power. Nature and society, subjectivity and structure, and fact and fiction are all effects of collective activity. ANT advances a *relational materiality,* the material extension of semiotics, which presupposes that all entities achieve significance in relation to others. Science, then, is a network of heterogeneous elements realized within a set of diverse practices.

THE ACTOR IN ANT

Taking seriously the agency of nonhumans (machines, animals, texts, and hybrids, among others), the ANT network is conceived as a heterogeneous amalgamation of textual, conceptual, social, and technical actors. The "volitional actor" for ANT, termed *actant,* is any agent, collective or individual, that can associate or disassociate with other agents. Actants enter into networked associations, which in turn define them, name them, and provide them with substance, action, intention, and subjectivity. In other words, actants are considered foundationally indeterminate, with no a priori substance or essence, and it is via the networks in which they associate that actants derive their nature. Furthermore, actants themselves develop as networks. Actors are combinations of symbolically invested "things," "identities," relations, and inscriptions, networks capable of nesting within other diverse networks.

THE NETWORK IN ANT

The terms *actor* and *network* are linked in an effort to bypass the distinction between agency and structure, a core preoccupation within sociology (as well as other disciplines). This distinction is neither useful nor necessary for ANT theorists, as macrolevel phenomena are conceived as networks that become more extensive and stabilized. Networks are processual, built activities, performed by the actants out of which they are composed. Each node and link is semiotically derived, making networks local, variable, and contingent.

Analytically, ANT is interested in the ways in which networks overcome resistance and strengthen internally, gaining coherence and consistence (stabilize); how they organize (juxtapose elements) and convert (translate) network elements; how they prevent actors from following their own proclivity (become durable); how they enlist others to invest in or follow the program (enroll); how they bestow qualities and motivations to actors (establish roles as scripts); how they become increasingly transportable and "useful" (simplify); and how they become functionally indispensable (as obligatory points of passage).

THE THEORY IN ANT

ANT is considered as much a method as a theory; anti-essentialism informs both the conceptual frame used for interpretation and guides the processes through which networks are examined. ANT advances three methodological principles. The first is *agnosticism,* which advocates abandoning any a priori assumptions of the nature of networks, causal conditions, or the accuracy of actant's accounts. ANT imposes impartiality and requires that all interpretations be unprivileged. The second principle is *generalized symmetry,* employing a single explanatory frame when interpreting actants, human and nonhuman. Investigators should never shift registers to examine individuals and organizations, bugs and collectors, or computers and their programmers. The third is *free association,* which advocates abandoning any distinction between natural and social phenomenon. These distinctions are the effects of networked activity, are not causal, and cannot provide explanation.

In line with its ethnomethodological roots, ANT theorists describe networks by "following the actor" into translations. Interested in contextual conversions as well as alterations in content, ANT advocates entering scientific debates prior to closure, examining *science in the making.*

THE CORE CONCEPT: TRANSLATION

For ANT theorists, the "success" of science is attributable to the ability of scientific networks: to force entities to pass through labs or clinics in order to harness "scientific evidence" within disputes; to translate materials, actors, and texts into *inscriptions* that allow influence at a distance; and to organize as *centers of translation* where network elements are defined and controlled, and strategies for translation are developed and considered.

Within all sociotechnical networks, relational effects result from disputes between actors, such as attempts at the advancement of a particular program, which necessarily results in social asymmetry. Therefore, ANT can also be considered a theory of the mechanics of power: the stabilization and reproduction of some interactions at the behest of others, the construction and maintenance of network centers and peripheries, and the establishment of hegemony. Rather than power as possession, power is persuasion, "measured" via the number of entities networked. Power is generated in a relational and distributed manner as a consequence of *ordering struggles.*

Central to ordering struggles is the concept of displacement, inherent in the process of translation. Translation (transport with deformation), as distinguishable from diffusion (transfer without distortion), is both a process and effect. Scientific knowledge and artifacts are translated as networks become more extensive and/or concentrated and as subsequent iterations emerge. Network actants, as well

as the relations that bind them, are translated as networks change. Thus, translation is the process of establishing identities and the conditions of interaction, and of characterizing representations.

However, translation is always at the same time a process of both social and physical displacement. Network elements deviate from previous inclinations are converted to *inscriptions* or *immutable mobiles* (combinable textual, cartographic, or visual representations that remain stable through space and time), are defined and ascribed roles, and are mobilized and/or circulated through translation. The realization of a set of networked possibilities entails that others are always unrealized. As effect, translation orders, and produces society and agency, nature and machine.

Translation is the process of converting entities, of making similar (such that one entity may be substituted for another) or simplifying (black-boxing or translating network elements into a single block) while retaining difference (translation is not simply transfer). In this sense, translation is also *betrayal,* of origins and of solidity. In short, translation is both a practice (making equivalent) and an outcome (both realized effects and the displacement of alternative possibilities), understood in terms of the translator, the translated, and the translation medium.

Networks characterized by a high level of *convergence* are those that demonstrate agreement as a result of translation. That is, converged networks are those that are both highly aligned and coordinated. *Alignment* describes the degree to which networks are defined by a common history and a shared space. *Coordination* refers to the adoption of convention, codification, and translation regiments. Tightly converged networks may also demonstrate strong *irreversibilisation.* The degree of irreversibility a network demonstrates refers to the capacity to return to a previous iteration of the network, as well as the degree to which subsequent translations are determined. Tightly converged and highly co-coordinated networks are, in other words, those that are simplified through translation.

Simplified networks, when resulting in single-point actants, are those that are *punctualized* or are *black-boxed.* Punctualized networks are considered only in terms of their input and output, are "taken for granted," or are counted as resource. Computed axial tomography (CAT) scans, despite their internal complexity; genes, despite their controversial nature; or the National Academy of Sciences, despite the expanse of entities enrolled, may become black-boxed.

Black boxes, however, may always be reopened. Networks demand continual maintenance because order is always provisional. As a set of dynamic alliances, networks are subject to possible desertion or competitor recruitment. Furthermore, the stabilization of a network, however temporary, involves the successful dismissal an *antiprogram* through prevailing in a *trial of strength* (the direct confrontation of a claim or a spokesperson). A *spokesperson*

speaks on the behalf of others, the entities he, she, or it constitutes (animals or machines who do not speak or masses of humans who defer to the spokespersons). Thus, spokespersons simplify networks of others (who may or may not consent) by representing their interests, attributing identity, establishing roles, and advancing a course of action. Outside actants may challenge a network's spokesperson (the validity or reliability of the representation) or confront an advanced claim (the "truthfulness" of the assertion or the efficacy of its measurements). Thus, domination is inherently both contestable and reversible.

SITUATING ANT

Emerging during the mid-1980s, ANT was situated within the sociology of science and technology. Traceable through semiotics/structuralism and into poststructuralism, ANT shares some similarities with Foucauldian material-semiotics and borrows from his conception of power/knowledge.

One can also identify parallels between Deleuze and Guattari's conception of the assemblage and the ANT network as dispersed, dynamic, performative, and topographical. Theorists have also remained faithful to ethnomethodology, acknowledging the built nature of sociotechnical networks and advocating an examination of the taken for granted.

Throughout the 1980s, ANT had not coalesced into a single theoretical perspective. Theorists presupposed that advancing a single set of principles was counter to the desire to sustain ANT as a diverse and dispersed set of practices with transformative properties. However, because of the portability of its fundamental concepts, ANT became a *fixed center* or *obligatory point of passage* by the mid-1990s. Essentially, ANT was black-boxed.

Throughout the latter part of the twentieth century and into the twenty-first, ANT was scathingly criticized: (1) as managerialist, (2) as emphasizing Nietzschean mastery, (3) as Machiavellian, (4) as colonizing "the other," (5) as antihumanist, and (6) as representing the powerful. By the end of the century, proponents engaged in a number of reactive/next-stage strategies. Some theorists advocated fundamental transformations. For example, recognition of the generative and corroborative potential of networked description led to the elevated import of decentering as vital to centering and "the other" as essential to network consolidation. Other representatives merged ANT with additional theoretical perspectives; ambivalence, oscillation, performance, and mobility surfaced as networked possibilities. Finally, sensitive to the betrayal of origins, Latour (1999) simply advocated, "abandoning what was wrong with ANT, that is 'actor,' 'network,' 'theory' without forgetting the hyphen" (p. 24).

— Cassandra S. Crawford

See also Ethnomethodology; Latour, Bruno; Semiology; Social Studies of Science

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AFFECT CONTROL THEORY

Affect control theory links social identities, actions, and emotions in a control system. In a control system, the processes operate to maintain a reference level (like a thermostat setting). In affect control theory, the reference levels are the affective meanings that are linked to labels for identities and actions. People learn these meanings (how good, how powerful, and how active things are) from their cultures. When they enter social interactions, they define situations with verbal labels, such as "I'm a teacher, and the person entering my office is an undergraduate student." The act of thinking about the situation in that way automatically evokes meanings about what teachers and undergraduate students are like on the three dimensions of goodness, powerfulness, and activity levels. The basic principle of affect control is that people expect, enact, and interpret actions that will *maintain* these culturally given meanings for the social identities and actions that occur in the situation. David R. Heise developed the theory from Charles Osgood's work on the semantic differential as a method for measuring affective meanings, from Harry Gollob's research on impression formation, and from William T. Power's control theory of perception.

The maintenance of meaning is what makes affect control theory a control system: The culturally learned meanings are stable aspects of how we think about our social world, and

they act as a reference level for interpreting what happens in social interactions. Events that occur can disturb the way people seem at any given moment (e.g., we can judge that the undergraduate student is lying to us, something we would not expect an occupant of a fundamentally good, slightly weak, very lively identity to do). When interactions are disturbed by events that don't maintain their cultural identity meanings, people tend to do things in ways that restore those meanings. So, a professor who thinks a student is lying to her might create a new event, such as "the professor challenges the student" that, when comprehended, would restore a sense that the student and professor were acting in ways that were expected or right. The theory does not require that this process be conscious: The professor may not be aware of trying to restore his or her identity and that of the student. But the action that will produce restoration is the predicted one.

If a new event cannot be enacted to restore their and others' identities, actors may instead change the way they are thinking about the situation in order to have the social interaction make sense. For example, if we see a news story that a priest has molested a child, this event is very hard to reconcile with our cultural meanings of priests as good, powerful, quiet people and children as good, weak, and lively. The mathematical equations (estimated from people's reactions to many different events) that form the empirical base of affect control theory tell us that good people are very unlikely to do very bad things to other good people. Such events cause massive changes in our impressions about the people involved (making us think that the priest is a much nastier, weaker, more active person than we expect priests to be, among other things). Since we cannot respond behaviorally to such an event, we are likely to try to find cognitive ways of dealing with it by redefining the situation. If the facts are ambiguous, a reader might assume that the action never happened and that the priest is being framed or persecuted. If the action is well anchored in the account, we may hold the parts of the event that we are sure of as given (the child and the molestation) and ask ourselves, "What kind of a person would do such an act?" The theory can model the construction of this new identity. Concretely, affect control theory uses mathematical equations to solve for the three-dimensional profile (of goodness, powerfulness, and activity) that would fit such an event. Such processing would produce an identity more like rapist or fiend than priest. So, when events occur that do not allow behavioral action to restore identity and action meanings, people relabel the situation instead. They come to see the actions in a different light (It wasn't a lie, it was just a misunderstanding) or label people with new identities (He's not a priest, he's a fiend). The theory views social actors as composites of many identities, one of which may be highlighted in a given situation because of institutional or affective constraints.

In affect control theory, emotions that people experience are a combination of the situated identity the person occupies (which is coded as a position on the three dimensions of goodness, powerfulness, and activity) and the ways in which events have shifted those meanings within the situation. When social interaction is serving to sustain people's identities (as affect control theory predicts that it usually will), emotions are a direct function of the identity meanings. So, acting as a friend will make you feel nicer than acting as a critic. Occupying stigmatized (low-evaluation, low-potency) identities leads to negative, powerless emotions. It makes people feel depressed and anxious. On the other hand, occupying high-status, powerful identities and operating to maintain their meanings leads to positive emotion.

Events fail to support identity meanings when people enter a situation with differing definitions of the situation (I think that you're a chum, while you think that you're my boss); when actions are misinterpreted (Your advice seems like criticism to me); or when physical/institutional constraints keep people from creating confirming events (I have to vote against tenuring a junior colleague who is my friend). After disturbing events, emotions signal both the new impressions that individuals have formed of themselves in their identities and the directions in which their identities have been deflected from their original, fundamental identity meanings. Therefore, a person who has hurt a friend might still view him- or herself as "friend" in the situation, but the transient, situated meanings of that identity after the hurtful act would produce much more negative feelings than the identity usually evokes. The person would feel bad, both because the situated meaning of the identity was negatively evaluated and because the deflection had moved it in a downward direction from an initially positive position.

— Lynn Smith-Lovin

See also Identity; Role Theory; Self; Social Interaction; Symbolic Interaction

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AGENCY-STRUCTURE INTEGRATION

One of the most important developments in recent European social theory has been the move toward an integration of agency and structure theories and theorists. This development parallels the rise of interest found in (generally) American sociology in the micro-macro integration. There are, however, important differences to be noted.

Agency, although it generally refers to microlevel actors, can also refer to macrolevel collectives that act. In other words, any social being, whether an individual or a collective, can be considered to have agency. Similarly, *structure,* although it usually refers to macrolevel structures, can also refer to microlevel phenomena, such as human interaction. Thus, the definition of both structure and agency can refer to either micro- or macrolevel phenomena.

The best way to illustrate what is meant by agency-structure integration is to give several examples of endeavors in this area. Perhaps the best-known effort is found in the work of Anthony Giddens (1984, 1989) and his structuration theory. Broadly, structuration theory is an attempt to theorize the relationship between agency and structure. Giddens draws on an exceptional number of theories, both critiquing them and drawing valuable resources from them. In the end, he rejects all theories with a strong agency or structure bias in favor of his theory, which he claims begins with "recurrent social practices" (Giddens 1989:252). He claims that agency and structure cannot and should not be thought of as separate forces, but rather as a duality existing in a dialectical relationship to one another. The two are indiscernible and coexisting in all forms of human activity.

Although the focus of Giddens's work begins with recurrent social practices, he is adamant that these practices are recursive. In other words, by engaging in activities as actors, or what he calls "practice," people are simultaneously constructing their own individual consciousnesses as well as the overall structure. Both consciousness and structure are produced and reinforced by practice, and both affect the way in which practice is played out. Giddens also develops the idea of the "double hermeneutic" to describe the difference in the way actors and sociologists use language. He says we should be concerned with the disparity in the language by which actors describe their own actions and the language used by sociologists to describe those actions. The way in which sociologists articulate what they are studying can have an effect on that phenomenon and hence may alter their findings.

Margaret Archer (1982) has developed another form of agency-structure integration, which looks at the linkage between agency and culture. She uses the term "culture" to refer to nonmaterial phenomena and ideas as opposed to structure, which she defines as material phenomena and interests. Although she acknowledges that the distinction between culture and structure is a conceptual one, since they are largely intertwined in the real world, she still argues that the two are not interchangeable and should, in fact, be kept distinct.

Archer's theory focuses on morphogenesis, or the process whereby intricate interchanges in the system lead not only to change in the overall structure of that system but also to an end product of structural elaboration. The opposite of this, morphostasis, refers to an absence of change. The process of morphogenesis involves properties that emerge from actions and interactions but are also distinct from them. It also implies that existing structures can act back on actions and interactions in a dialectical fashion. Both morphogenesis and morphostasis are processes that occur over time and focus on the infinite number of potential structural changes, alterations in action and interaction, and structural elaboration that are possible.

Archer's theory is an attempt to develop a systems theory alternative to, and a critique of, Giddens's structuration theory. One of the most distinct differences between Archer's work and that of Giddens is her case for the benefits of using dualities. Archer believes that agency and culture are indeed separate entities and that denying this separation denies the possibility of examining the effects of one upon the other. She is also critical of Giddens's theory, as she sees it as too open-ended. In contrast, her theory tends toward structural elaboration.

Another prominent theorist to attempt agency-structure integration is the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu (1977, 1984, 1990). His theory of habitus and field is animated by his desire to break down what he sees as the unnecessary barrier between objectivism (largely structure) and subjectivism (largely agency). He focuses on the dialectical relationship between the two and what he sees as the outcome of this dialectic, or practice. His theory implies that practice is neither the result of unconstrained free will nor entirely coerced by some outside force.

Bourdieu's theory is built around what he calls "constructivist structuralism." He is concerned with the way in which actors view their social world, based on their location in it. This viewpoint, however, is affected by the structure of the social world, which provides both the setting for and the constraints on the perceptions of actors. Bourdieu's interest lies in the relationship (not always dialectical) between social and mental structures.

Bourdieu uses the terms "habitus" and "field" to describe the two major components of his theory. *Habitus* refers to the cognitive structures people use to deal with the social world. It is a "structuring structure" in that it is both structured by and structures the way actors deal with the outside social world. Each individual has a different habitus, and it is based on the position one has within the larger social environment. In other words, it is affected by things such as age, wealth, sex, physical appearance, occupation,

and so on. *Field,* on the other hand, is not a structure, but rather a term used to describe the series of relationships between the positions in it. It does not describe interactions or social ties between the objective locations within it, but rather exists independently of whatever actors or institutions are a part of it and acts to constrain them. It is a type of battlefield where the positions in it fight to improve their positions by means of drawing upon their stock of various kinds of capital (social, economic, symbolic, cultural).

Jürgen Habermas (1987, 1991) is another contemporary theorist who has tried to integrate structure and agency with his theory of the "colonization of the lifeworld." Habermas, whose main focus is on communicative action and promoting free and open speech, fears the encroachment of what he calls the "system on the lifeworld." He defines the system as the realm of formal rationality (using Weber's terms) and the lifeworld as the realm of substantive rationality. The colonization of the lifeworld, therefore, involves an increase in formal rationality at the expense of substantive rationality. This idea is similar to that of Weber's on the iron cage of rationality.

The lifeworld is an internal perspective that guides the way actors perceive the outside world (or the system). It is one way (the system is the other) of looking at the same society. Habermas ties it heavily to communicative action and fears that both are becoming increasingly constrained. This constraint, in turn, leads to a "growing differentiation between culture, society, and personality" (Habermas 1987:288).

The system is an external perspective that involves the way an outside actor not involved in society would view things. Although the system is rooted in the lifeworld, it has its own characteristics separate and distinct from the lifeworld. As these components grow and become strengthened through the maintenance-oriented actions of the lifeworld, they become more distant from and impose themselves on the lifeworld. This distancing, in turn, weakens the functions of the system (corresponding to those of the lifeworld) of cultural reproduction, social integration, and personality formation.

Overall, the move toward agency-structure integration in Europe has become what many there consider the major issue in modern social theory. Theorists such as Giddens, Archer, Bourdieu, and Habermas have developed theories that attempt to bring together both agency and structure (although each uses slightly different terms to describe these two concepts) into one integrated paradigm. Paralleling the rise of micro-macro integration in the United States, agency-structure integration is likely to be a focal point in European social theory in the coming years.

— Michael Ryan

See also Bourdieu, Pierre; Giddens, Anthony; Habermas, Jürgen; Habitus; Micro-Macro Integration

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AGIL

Talcott Parsons's AGIL schema summarizes the four functional requisites or imperatives of any system of action: adaptation (A), goal attainment (G), integration (I), and latent pattern maintenance (L). Also known as the four-function paradigm, the AGIL schema specifies for structural-functional theory the needs of any living system and how that system maintains order in relation to both its external environment and internal organization. Parsons argued that the AGIL schema could be employed in the analysis and study of both abstract systems of action and actually existing, concrete societies. Parsons, in collaboration with Robert F. Bales and Edward A. Shils, first formulated the AGIL schema in the *Working Papers in the Theory of Action* (1953).

One must first locate the AGIL schema at the highest level of abstraction found in structural-functional social theory, the general theory of action. One key tenet of the general theory of action states that any complex of actions or behaviors may be characterized as a system of action in which the parts interact with one another and with the external environment of the system. Each part of the system performs certain functions for the maintenance of the system as a whole. Some of these functions involve the relationship of the system to its external environment, while

others involve the interrelationship of the parts of the system to each other and to the whole. In addition, functions may be characterized as either consummatory or instrumental. The former describes functions concerning the determination of the ends or goals of a system, while the latter describes functions concerning the means with which the system pursues its ends. Four functional requisites of any system emerge from the superimposition of these two distinctions:

- Adaptation is an *instrumental* function by which a system adapts to its *external* environment or adapts the external environment to the system.
- Goal attainment is a *consummatory* function that defines the goals and ends of a system and mobilizes resources to attain them. Goal attainment is generally oriented *externally.*
- Integration is a *consummatory* function that manages the interrelationships of the parts of a system. The integration function maintains *internal* coherence and solidarity within the system.
- Latent pattern maintenance is an *instrumental* function that supplies all actors in the system with a source of motivation. It provides normative patterns and manages the tensions of actors *internal* to the system.

Parsons and his colleagues argued that any system of action could be further broken down into subsystems of action, each of which corresponds to one of the AGIL functions. The *behavioral organism* performs the adaptation function, and although it is the subsystem that adapts to and transforms the physical world, Parsons devoted much more energy to analyzing the other three subsystems. The *personality,* or personality system, performs the goal attainment function insofar as it defines objectives and mobilizes resources for the pursuit of ends. The *social system* performs the function of integration by means of generating solidarity and loyalty, defining acceptable and unacceptable actions, granting rewards, and enforcing constraints. For Parsons, the social system consists of manifold interactions between ego and alter, norms and values, sanctions, status-roles, and social institutions. Parsons insisted that social theorists could analyze many phenomena—from firms to entire societies—as social systems. The *cultural system* performs the function of latent pattern maintenance by supplying motivation to actors through ordered sets of symbols and institutionalized patterns to the system as a whole. Parsons placed a great deal of emphasis on the importance of the cultural system for the stability of action systems.

The four subsystems are analytically distinct from and irreducible from one another, but one must remember that they are interrelated and interdependent in many ways. Note that the four subsystems are each analytical and heuristic tools that do not correspond directly to reality; rather, they are aids for thinking about how systems function.

Parsons argued that just as an abstract system of action can be analyzed in terms of the four functional imperatives and the corresponding subsystems of action, so concrete societies (as opposed to social systems) could be studied in terms of their constituent subsystems. Parsons thus argued that any given society (which could be an empire or a tribe but was generally considered as a nation-state) consists of an economy, a polity, a fiduciary system, and a societal community.

The *economy* performs the function of adaptation by means of the labor through which goods are produced and distributed. The economy thereby assists a society in adapting to and transforming its environment. The *polity,* which Parsons defines broadly to include many forms of defining societal objectives, making decisions, and mobilizing resources (e.g., firms and social movements as well as the state), carries out the function of goal attainment. The *societal community* performs the function of integration and thereby coordinates the various institutions of society and maintains the ties of interdependency between its members. Religion, law, or citizenship in the nation help to create coordination, consent, coercion, and the ties of solidarity that promote stability and order in a society. Here, Parsons's work on the AGIL schema owes a great deal to the thinking of Émile Durkheim. The *fiduciary system* carries out the function of latent pattern maintenance. The fiduciary system is Parsons's formulation of socialization, which he argued was carried out primarily by the family and schools, although other institutions, such as the media, could also contribute to this function. The fiduciary system transmits and instills norms, values, and patterned sets of symbols to the members of a society, thus providing them with motivation.

— James M. Murphy

See also General Systems Theory; Parsons, Talcott; Structural Functionalism

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ALEXANDER, JEFFREY

Jeffrey C. Alexander (b. 1947) is one of America's most prominent social theorists. Throughout his career, Alexander has waged an aggressive campaign in defense of general theory. Steering a middle course between radical relativism (especially in its postmodern form) and traditional positivism, Alexander's postpositivist epistemology, elaborated in the first volume of *Theoretical Logic in Sociology* (1982–1983) and *Fin-de-Siècle Social Theory* (1995), presents a nuanced case in support of decentered reason and the universalizing thrust of social theory, while reproving the reduction of theory to fact. The remaining three volumes of *Theoretical Logic* join postpositivism to an ecumenical impulse that aims at transcending the interminable debates between warring schools. Multidimensionality is the most sophisticated expression of this synthesizing ambition. Alexander depicts social science as a continuum stretching from the abstract to the concrete. Presuppositions are this continuum's most general and decisive element, and action and order are the key presuppositions. Historically, sociologists have addressed action by selecting either rational approaches that portray action as an instrumental adaptation to material conditions or nonrational perspectives that highlight how internal dispositions mediate the relationship between actors and their (external) environments. Order has been addressed by either individualist theories that portray it as the product of individual negotiations or choice, or collectivist paradigms that explain it in terms of the emergent properties of social organization itself. These one-sided depictions of action and order have produced more heat than light, and Alexander offers multidimensionality as a presuppositional synthesis that breaks through this analytic impasse. Multidimensionality actually involves two distinct syntheses, the first (and stronger) of which holds that action is shaped both by rational adaptations to external conditions *and* actors' subjective commitments. The weaker synthesis recommends a collectivistic stance to order while acknowledging that individualistic theories, with their elucidation of the contingent dimensions of action, supply useful empirical insights into how social structures are (re)produced and transformed.

Multidimensionality's primary purpose is evaluative and prescriptive. Postpositivism holds that social science is a two-tiered process, propelled as much by theoretical logic as by empirical evidence. Consequently, sociological theory and research should be assessed not only by reference to facts but also in terms of their presuppositions. In *Theoretical Logic, Twenty Lectures* (1987) and innumerable other critical readings, Alexander demonstrates how classic and contemporary formulations falling short of multidimensionality are rent by internal inconsistencies, residual categories, conflated levels of analysis, and empirical anomalies. These weaknesses prompt ad hoc revisions, but so long as the framework's presuppositions fall short of multidimensionality, there are fundamental debilities that no amount of tinkering and fine-tuning can remedy. Ultimately, there is only one viable solution to these theoretical dilemmas and empirical shortcomings: Sociological theory and research must be reconstructed along multidimensional lines.

Alexander's middle-range contributions to the study of social change, culture, and civil society complement his general theorizing. *Differentiation and Social Change* (1990) reconstructs Durkheim's and Parsons's neoevolutionary explanations of modernity, arguing that accounts depicting structural differentiation as an adaptation to environmental exigencies should be supplemented with in-depth, historical investigations that examine how institutional entrepreneurs, research mobilization, coalition formation, and group competition and conflict affect the course of differentiation. He also presents a more inclusive conception of the consequences of differentiation, noting that in addition to increased efficiency and reintegration, highly differentiated societies spawn considerable anxiety, various pathologies, and new forms of conflict within and between differentiated institutions.

Cultural sociology is a principal focus of Alexander's current efforts. Comprised of symbolic sets, culture patterns action as surely as more visible material conditions. The partial autonomy of culture is assured because meaning derives not from the concrete referent signified by a symbol, but from the interrelations of symbols themselves. Culture structures reality cognitively, and it also performs crucial evaluative tasks. In *Durkheimian Sociology* (1988), Alexander argues that sacred symbols supply images of purity and oblige those committed to them to protect their referents from harm. Profane symbols embody this harm, providing images of pollution and danger, and identifying groups and actions that must be defended against. In *Evil and Good* (2001), he asserts that cultural systems are no less preoccupied with the "negative" than they are with the "positive": The bad, evil, and undesirable are central components of all cultural systems and are symbolized every bit as elaborately as the good, right, and desirable. For Alexander, the conflict between good and bad functions inside culture as an internal dynamic; contention and negation are culturally coded and expected; repression, exclusion, and domination are vital elements of symbol systems; and pollution and purification are key ritual processes evident even in ostensibly secular societies. Alexander employs his cultural sociology to shed new light on a variety of phenomena, ranging from Watergate to technology and social theory itself.

Alexander is also investigating the emergence and transformation of civil society. *Real Civil Societies* (1998) describes the civil sphere as an arena analytically and empirically differentiated from other institutions (e.g., the

state and market) and gives particular attention to the solidary aspects of the modern civil realm. Civil solidarity revolves around a distinctive type of universalizing community, an inclusive "we-ness" that comes gradually to be defined and enforced. The growth of the civil realm is far from inevitable, and moments of expansion are frequently followed by periods of particularistic retrenchment. The ebb and flow of civil solidarity are partially due to the interrelations between civil and noncivil spheres, and Alexander examines these boundary relations in terms of three ideal-typical forms: destructive intrusions, civil repairs, and facilitating inputs. He amplifies this model of civil society, contingent conception of inclusion, and systemic analysis of boundary relations by examining the discursive strategies fought by social movements championing a more egalitarian society. In *The Possibilities of Justice* (forthcoming), Alexander presents a provocative reinterpretation of the civil rights movement, emphasizing its ability to translate the exclusion of African Americans into a profane transgression against the sacred core of American civil society.

— Paul Colomy

See also Civil Society; Durkheim, Émile; Metatheory; Structural Functionalism

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ALIENATION

Alienation: a romantic image of great influence, claiming that we are not and cannot be at home in the modern world, but must be powerfully alienated from it. The idea is connected especially to the work of the young Karl Marx, where it is central to the so-called *Paris Manuscripts* of 1844. It came to represent a key concern into the 1960s, when these writings of the young Marx were first translated into English, coinciding with the emergence of the counterculture across America and Europe. The idea of alienation has significant precedents in the work of Rousseau and Schiller. There, it was the human spirit in struggle against modern civilization. For the early Rousseau, the self was at home in nature; civilization was an artefact, a blot on the landscape. For Schiller, the industrial division of labour resulted in the division or dissection of the human individual. This became a key theme or sensibility in Marx's work, through to *Capital:* "To subdivide a person is to execute them." Thus the connection with counterculture radicalism, anticonservatism, and opposition to war and bureaucracy: "I am an individual, do not bend, fold, or spindle."

The idea of alienation in its broadest use therefore reflects this romantic intellectual theme and its popular rendition into the 1960s. It responds to what Cornelius Castoriadis would call the "demand of autonomy." By the 60s, it came to represent a more generalized sense of being "out of it." For Marx, in contrast, alienation had a more precise and detailed meaning; and though the *Paris Manuscripts* are often incomplete, and suggestive more than substantive, Marx's views on alienation are clear and strong, and typologized. Alienation, for Marx, refers centrally to the alienation of labour. The early Marx holds creative labour to be the essence of humanity. To live is to act, to transform the world and the self. Labour is the medium of this process. Marx thus works out of a tradition of philosophical anthropology, for which humanity is defined as creative or generative and social institutions are subjected to criticism on the grounds that they work against such qualities. What is wrong with capitalism, for the young Marx, is not that it is unfair or inefficient in its distribution, but that it denies the human essence. It denies the right creatively to labour. In the German language, some tension exists regarding what in English we call alienation. Literally, alienation is *Entfremdung,* where *fremd* is strange or alien, which of course presumes this prior original condition. Marx also refers, however, to *Entausserung,* which is usually translated as objectification. Human animals objectify themselves; we make our worlds; the bee makes its too, but we design ours first in our heads. Objectification is not stigmatic or negative in the way that alienation is; it refers to the expressionist sense of *Ausdruck,* that culture results from expressing something that is held to be innate in us (or in some of us).

Marx's typology of alienation shifts through four stages or movements, all connected to this ontology of labour. As Marx explains it, alienated labour involves, first, alienation

from the object of labour, the thing produced. Alienation is a hard material fact; I produce for the other, for the master; I relinquish control over the results of production. I give over of my self and my labour to the other. I objectify myself, here, but not in circumstances of my choosing; the necessary act of *Entausserung,* or objectification, is turned under the relations of private property into *Entfremdung.* Alienated labour involves, second, alienation from the process of production. Marx's ultimate value concern is with human activity and not the distribution of things. Humans are defined by their creative capacities. To be denied of the process creatively to labour is to be denied our humanity. This is the ontologically most significant aspect of alienation: alienation from the capacity to create, or to transform the world, nature, and culture through labour. Third, Marx insists, there is an additional dynamic. As we are alienated from the results of the process and the process of labour itself, so are we alienated from each other, from our fellows, with whom we ought really cooperate rather than compete or remain indifferent toward. We are therefore alienated from each other in the process of alienated labour. Fourth, Marx argues at a more abstract level (and this category disappears from his later work) that when we alienate our labour, we are alienated from the human essence as species-being (*Gattungswesen*). This seems to be an abstract extension of the previous claim: We alienate ourselves not only from the particularity of our immediate coworkers but also from the generality of humanity as such.

The young Marx retains this kind of cosmological naturalism or humanism. It reflects his conversion via Feuerbach to the idea that we endow God (or capital) with power, denying it to ourselves. In its totality, this argument appeals in its antimodernism. It implies preference for the nonalienated world before capitalism, of a kind that is often associated with Tönnies in *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft.* Where for Rousseau or Schiller, the source of the problem is modern civilization, for Marx it is modernity as capitalism. In Marx's later work, the figure of alienation gives way to that of commodification, where commodification includes the commodification of labour-power. After Marx, with Lukács and via Simmel, the idea refigures as reification, thingification, the transformation of process into an apparently unmovable world of things that appears to precede us and to control us, as if by magic. The idea of the *Fremder,* or stranger, is recast by Simmel as a modern personality-type. Marx's prepossession with labour as the defining activity of humanity becomes a focus of critique for Hannah Arendt and later Jürgen Habermas, where politics or communication is viewed as central rather than labour.

— Peter Beilharz

See also Capitalism; Lukács, György; Marx, Karl

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ALTHUSSER, LOUIS

Louis Althusser (1918–1990) was born in Birmandries, in Algeria, to a petit-bourgeois, Catholic family. His father, Charles Althusser, was a bank manager and had all the traits of the authoritarian colonialist personality. The young Louis was fascinated by monastic life and remained a believer until after World War II.

In 1939, Althusser began his *agrégation* in philosophy at the prestigious École Normale Supérieure (Rue d'Ulm) in Paris, but the war intervened, so it was not until 1946, after a period in a German prison camp, that he could continue his studies, taking his agrégation in 1948, the same year that he joined the French Communist Party. After this, Althusser became the *caïman* of the École Normale Supérieure, a position that involved preparing candidates for the agrégation in philosophy.

While a student at the École—and still suffering the after effects of being a prisoner of war, manifested in severe bouts of depression—Althusser met his future wife, Hélène Rytman, with whom he had a tempestuous and tragic relationship. It ended in Althusser taking his wife's life in November 1980.

Thus, despite becoming a hard-line Marxist, Althusser's biography points to a supremely tormented and conflicted individual who truly agonised over the state of the world and his own, often less-than-admirable personal traits.

This, then, is the man who became the leading thinker of Structuralist Marxism. As such, he led the movement against the humanist interpretation of Marx's work, an interpretation based on Marx's Hegelian and Feuerbachian early works. Indeed, Althusser, famously, became a theoretical antihumanist, claiming that if Marx was humanist in his theory of capital, he was little different from many other nineteenth-century, including Christian, thinkers. The most important ideas for which Althusser became well-known can be summarised in the following terms: (1) problematic, (2) symptomatic reading, (3) Marx's science (of the mode of production), (4) epistemological break, (5) overdetermination, and (6) ideology. We shall examine each of these in turn.

When considering what distinguishes Marx's theory of history and economic relations from other epistemological and ontological positions, Althusser claims that Marx was not simply the inheritor of the classical political economy framework, nor was he a philosopher in the style of Hegel's idealism and Feuerbach's humanism, even if Marx's early works, such as *The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts* (1967) are often couched in the language of Hegel (1770–1831) and Feuerbach (1804–1872). Even if in his early work Marx ponders the nature of the essence of "man," this does not constitute the core of his originality. Moreover, while at the level of appearance, Marx seems to endorse the idea that the proletariat—like the poor in Christianity—will come to inherit the wealth of society because they are its producers and the revealers of its essence, this does not constitute Marx's originality. Instead, the significant difference that is discernible between Marx's writing of the 1840s and his work between 1857 and 1863, including *Capital,* must be interpreted. In the later writing, Marx is not looking for the essence of "man," but for the logic of the capitalist system in history. That capitalism is a system has fundamental implications for its theorisation. To explain how Marx's originality might be couched in a language and a terminology that were sometimes evocative of an earlier philosophical era, Althusser uses the term *problematic.*

A problematic marks out a horizon of thought and is the framework within which problems are posed. At a given historical conjuncture, it limits the language and concepts that are available for expressing ideas and problems. It is the precondition of a given theoretical field of inquiry. The point, then, is that Marx was forced to use concepts and language that preceded him, namely, the language, at times, of Feuerbachian humanism and classical political economy. Marx's problematic is not the condition of the labourer or of humanity in general under capitalism, but the idea of a mode of production and its history, which is a structural notion. The real question, Althusser says, has to do with how a mode of production gives insight into the relationship between the material infrastructure and the ideological superstructure of a social formation.

To discern a new problematic in Marx's writing entails reading Marx in a rigorous way so that the similarity between the language of the problematic of classical political economy and that of Marx's problematic are not allowed to be fused together. To enable him to do this from a methodological point of view, Althusser developed the notion of a *symptomatic* reading. Following Freud's method for interpreting dreams, a symptomatic reading is not content with a literal approach to a text, but sees the manifest content as disguising a latent content, the presence of which is signalled by possible inconsistencies, contradictions, and repetitions—in other words, by symptomatic phenomena.

Related to the method of a symptomatic reading is the concept, indebted to Gaston Bachelard (1884–1962) and the French tradition of epistemology, of an epistemological break. Just because a single author is deemed to have written a range of works does not mean that they are all derived from the same epistemological source. Thus, the fact that Marx's works up to 1857 rely on an Enlightenment, humanist epistemological framework does not entail that the later works do. There can be an epistemological break between works of the same author, as there can be between the works of different authors.

Part of Marx's new problematic is his discovery of the concept of the mode of production. Althusser reiterates that the mode of production is the unique object of historical materialism and that now, there is no "society," only modes of production that evolve in history and are immanent at the different levels of the structured, social whole. The social whole is still equivalent to the determination by the economy "in the last instance." So, the economy is still there as a determining factor, but it manifests itself only in a displaced way.

In other words, the social whole is not an expression, or reflection, of the economic infrastructure. The nature of the economic mode of production cannot be "read off" the surface effects of the whole. Instead, once again, as we find in Freud, there is the phenomenon of "overdetermination," where the reality of the mode of production is not directly expressed in ideology or consciousness. Only the operation of science can reveal the ways in which a given mode of production impacts on the numerous levels of the social formation. Such a science itself has to avoid the empiricist notion that reality is ultimately directly reflected in symbolic forms. Science is always a construction of reality carried out according to the rule of science prevailing at a given historical moment.

Finally, Althusser in his later work developed a theory of ideology that saw it as being "without history" providing the framework in which people live their relationships to the social reality in which they are located. Subjects are formed in ideology, as it is this that locates them in the system of relationships necessary for the maintenance of unequal class relations. Ideology "hails" people as particular individuals and subjects and, in doing so, forms identities that are functional to the capitalist system of exploitation. Most of all, though, Althusser argues that ideology is not an intellectual illusion, but is a practice—the spontaneous practice through which people live everyday life. Such practices are supported by, and give support to, the "ideological state apparatuses" (school, church, legal system, family, communications, political parties) that ensure that the capitalist system keeps functioning.

— John Lechte

See also Historical Materialism; Marx, Karl; Marxism; Political Economy; Social Class; Theory Construction

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ANNALES SCHOOL

The phrase "*Annales* school" refers to the journal *Annales d'Histoire Économique et Sociale,* founded in France in 1929 by Lucien Febvre and Marc Bloch, and to the work of subsequent French historians such as Fernand Braudel, Emmanuel LeRoy Ladurie, Jacques LeGoff, Georges Duby, and others who either edited or were closely associated with this journal. The *Annales* school originated in the post-1900 European setting of cultural ferment in which historians and social scientists sought new approaches to the intellectual problems inherited from the past. Febvre and Bloch were both critical of the predominant emphasis on famous persons and events as well as the documentary methods currently advanced by historians such as Langlois and Seignebos. They were both sympathetic to a variety of new intellectual currents, including Henri Berr's quest for a synthesis of historical knowledge, the work of the geographer Vidal de la Blache, the Durkheim school of sociology, Lucien Lévy-Bruhl's studies of "primitive mentalities," and the efforts of historians and economists such as Henri Pirenne and François Simiand to create a comparative history informed by scientific methods. Durkheim's *L'Année Sociologique,* founded in 1898, and Berr's *Revue de Synthèse Historique,* founded in 1900, both provided models of broadly interdisciplinary cooperation.

Much of the work leading to the formation and early history of *Annales* was accomplished at Strasbourg, where both Febvre and Bloch taught between 1920 and 1933. The environment there was well suited to new intellectual initiatives. Researchers from a variety of disciplines worked in close contact with one another. These included the historians Henri Bremond and Georges Lefebvre, who both worked on problems of historical psychology and mentalities, as well as the sociologist Maurice Halbwachs, who wrote on collective memory, was a member of the Durkheim school of sociology, and was also on the original editorial board of *Annales.*

Although Braudel later protested the designation "school" to describe the work of the *Annales* group, the studies done by *Annales* historians share several distinctive perspectives that make the designation "school" generally convincing, if we are cautious to also take into account the individual and generational differences among its various members. The central orientations promoted by Febvre and Bloch, which initially defined the new approach, included a focus on problem-oriented history; the use of comparative methods in historical research; the development of a more synthetic total history; the creation of a new social history that investigates the lives of previously neglected populations, rather than only rulers and elites; the anchorage of historical research in geographical, environmental (and in the later *Annales* writers, even climatic) contexts; and, finally, study of the "mentalities" informing historical societies.

The second generation of *Annales* historians, under the added influence of Braudel and Ernest Labrousse, supplemented this overall agenda with a focus on material civilization, a strongly quantitative and statistical approach to economic and social history, and an attempt to construct serial histories tracing the precise fluctuations of not only prices, production, and availability of goods but also cultural productions such as publications, religious documents, and so forth. Accompanying these newer empirical foci was a shared delineation of three dimensions of historical time that had been only implicit in the work of Febvre and Bloch. This temporal division included (1) a short term, focused on notable persons and political events (*histoire événementielle*) largely scorned by the *Annales* group; (2) the study of shorter historical periods (e.g., one to two centuries), with a focus on the distinctive outcomes, or conjunctures, resulting from the mutual interconnections of economic and social and, to a lesser degree, cultural processes; and (3) the *longue durée* of history, focused on the impact of enduring geohistorical and civilizational structures. In general, later historians in this group have typically adopted the broad distinction between structure and conjuncture as one of their central organizing motifs.

Despite their common interest in redirecting historical scholarship, Febvre and Bloch each worked in his own distinctive direction. Febvre was a wide-ranging, restless thinker who wrote essays on a variety of topics, often to challenge other historians into new ways of approaching historical questions or establish the importance of new topics. He wrote a study of the Franche-Comté region, a geographical introduction to history published in Berr's series, *L'évolution d'humanité,* and myriad essays exploring

a wide range of historical topics, especially the Renaissance and Reformation. Febvre especially encouraged the study of the emotional climates and moral sensibilities of the past. He urged new historical studies of the history of love, hatred, fear, death, and related emotional states. Although he admired the work of the few previous investigators in these fields, such as Johan Huizinga, he was also critical of that author's book on *The Waning of the Middle Ages* (1919). He thought it provided an excessively schematic depiction of the radical alternation of emotional states in late medieval culture and argued that the ambivalence of emotional structures is found in every civilization.

Febvre was the author or coauthor of several books that figure prominently in current historical and sociological scholarship. His study (with Henri Martin) of *The Coming of the Book* (1958), published after Febvre's death, has received increasing attention more recently. Its focus on changing material culture associated with the explosion of the printed word engaged Febvre's interest in mentalities and added historical substance to the theoretical issues being raised by Marshall McLuhan concerning the orchestration of the senses in various cultures and the rise of modern print culture. However, Febvre's greatest and most enduring work is *The Problem of Unbelief in the Sixteenth Century: The Religion of Rabelais* (1942). This was also a study of mentalities and for a time, the only substantial one done by the *Annales* group. It also focused on the ideas of elite or literary culture and had strong links to traditional intellectual history. In that respect, it stood out from the later *Annales* investigations of mentalities, which emphasized the study of popular culture and collective psychology. In his work on unbelief, Febvre drew on the Durkheimian conception of basic categories and words as "mental equipment" and argued against the so-called modernity of Rabelais as a forerunner of an atheistic worldview. In Febvre's view, unbelief was impossible in an era saturated in religious sentiment, terminology, and controversy, where the term *atheist* itself was used to register disagreement with an opponent's religious ideas. Febvre also summarized, before McLuhan, the basic theme of that author's later writings when he argued that the sixteenth century saw a shift from the predominance of the ear to that of the eye. Only with the shift in the latter half of the sixteenth century to newer philosophical and scientific ideas, under the influence of figures such as Descartes, does the sixteenth-century mentality undergo a substantial transformation, reflected in the large increase in the number of key terms newly available to later sixteenth-century thinkers.

While Febvre concentrated on early modern-European history, Bloch was primarily a medievalist. Although he was influenced by Marx and emphasized the historical role of the common people rather than political elites, in several respects, he was closer to the sociological approach of the Durkheim school. He developed precise concepts for use in historical research (e.g., the concept of feudal society), emphasized the importance of collective sentiments and beliefs, and aimed at the creation of a "total history." He wrote an early regional study of the Île-de-France but also advanced the study of comparative history at both the methodological and substantive levels. He carried out comparisons of particular institutions, social groups, and historical processes (e.g., kingship, administrative classes) within the orbit of European civilization (e.g., France, England, Germany) but also ventured into a wider field of comparisons between civilizations (e.g., European and Japanese feudalism). He was interested in technical change but focused on the social and cultural forces that molded technology. For example, he argued that slavery declined in Europe partly because of the influence of Christian ideas, which in turn created a dearth of servile labor and initiated a quest for new laborsaving technologies.

Bloch's first major book, his most Durkheimian work, was *Royal Touch* (1924). It employed the concept of collective representations to examine the collective psychology behind this belief and drew, as well, on Lévy-Bruhl's notion of primitive mentality and J. G. Frazer's studies of sacred kingship. It traced the healing power attributed to kings from the medieval through the early modern period and focused on a comparison of France and England.

Bloch's longest and most important book is the two-volume *Feudal Society* (1939–1940). Although Febvre himself took exception to what he thought was its excessively sociological and abstract presentation of medieval history, it represents Bloch's most successful attempt, and perhaps that of the entire *Annales* school, to write a "total history." Through the use of the concept of a "feudal society," it combines into a synthetic whole the understanding of the environment, economic life, political power, personal ties, social groups and classes, collective beliefs, sentiments and practices, and the work of intellectuals in the European middle ages. It is also a comparative study of societies set within the framework of European "civilization" in its medieval historical form. Although it pays more attention to social groups and to the masses than to the individuals and families in the political elite, it does discuss political organization.

Bloch also wrote more on economic and social history than Febvre. After his departure from Strasbourg in 1936, he assumed Henri Hauser's Chair of Economic History at Paris. In this respect, he was closer than Febvre to the concerns of many later members of the *Annales* school. His book on *French Rural History* (1931) is in some respects his most personal book, because of its focus on rural peasant economy and society with which Bloch identified so strongly. It examined the longue durée of history from the twelfth to the eighteenth centuries and used the "regressive" method of moving from the known to the unknown, developed by earlier historians such as Frederic William

Maitland, to reconstruct the "original characteristics" of French agriculture.

During the five years between Marc Bloch's death in 1944, at the hands of the Nazis, and the publication in 1949 of Fernand Braudel's book on *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World at the Time of Phillip II,* a second generation of *Annales* historians emerged into prominence. Also, several institutional changes took place that affected the group. In 1946, the journal's title was changed to *Annales: Économies, Sociétés, Civilizations,* indicating a shift in emphasis from the earlier title. More important was the formation in 1947 of the new Sixth Section of the École Pratique des Hautes Études. Febvre became president of the Section as well as director of the Centre de Récherches Historiques, a subsection of the larger Sixth Section. After Febvre's death in 1956, Braudel became editor of the journal. The new Sixth Section provided the *Annales* group with an influential organizational center from which to disseminate their vision of historical research.

Several other influences within *Annales* were at work in defining the school's major historical concerns. In particular, the second generation of *Annales* turned toward a strongly quantitative, statistical, and even "materialistic" approach to history and focused heavily on economic history. In this respect, François Simiand, an economist closely associated with the Durkheim school, provided an important inspiration. Simiand had been an early critic of established historiography and, in 1932, had published an influential work on the general movement of prices, where he distinguished between the phases of economic expansion (called "A Phases") and contraction (the "B Phases") in longer economic cycles. This distinction became central to later *Annales* historians in their efforts to chart the relationships between price fluctuations and social, cultural, and political changes. Ernest Labrousse was a second influential pioneer of this approach. His work of 1933 on the history of prices and revenues in eighteenth-century France set the tone for many later studies. Labrousse introduced the use of more statistical methods as well as a greater appreciation of Marxism's contributions (something that Marc Bloch had developed earlier, if to a lesser extent).

After its publication, Braudel's massive study of the Mediterranean world became one of the major reference points for later *Annales* authors. The book's geographical focus on a sea as the unifying historical force marked an extension to a new scale of the more limited regional studies done by earlier members of *Annales* and continued by later authors. Its temporal emphasis was decidedly on the longue durée of slowly changing, indeed almost stable "structures" emerging around the Mediterranean. However, it also had a second substantial focus on the sixteenth-century "conjunctures" of economic, social and, to a lesser degree, cultural processes. Events, persons, and political processes occupied a distant third place in Braudel's study.

Perhaps equally important was Braudel's attention to the spatial dimensions of history.

The book became the subject of widespread praise but also extensive critical commentary. While some of the book's detailed historical arguments have been challenged, the major criticisms have focused on larger issues of perspective and method. For example, Braudel was thought to be excessively deterministic and place too much emphasis on the long-term "destiny" forged for societies by the Mediterranean environment. The book seemed to be a "history without people." Braudel's neglect of actors and events seemed to eliminate the element of voluntarism from history. Despite its chapter on "civilizations," his study also lacked any fuller engagement with the problem of "mentalities" (one of Febvre's major interests). In general, the *Annales* group has given much greater attention to the economies and societies subtitle of their journal and much less to the study of their third putative focus, civilizations. However, Braudel was later to give a series of lectures on civilizations, published after his death, which partially remedied this neglect and contains a particularly important introductory chapter on the concept of civilization in history and the social sciences. This chapter draws particularly on the earlier ideas of Marcel Mauss about civilizations.

Braudel followed his Mediterranean work with another, equally ambitious three-volume study of early modern economy and society. While the book focused on Europe, it generally adopted a global perspective and drew in a wider range of comparisons among civilizations. The first volume struck a characteristically Braudellian note with its emphasis on material civilization. The second volume focused on the expansion of early modern commerce, while the third traced the emergence of a world perspective and global socioeconomic system. In this final volume, Braudel resisted the effort to create a more coherent image of the modern capitalist world system, such as the one developed later by Immanuel Wallerstein (under Braudel's influence). Braudel remained a historian with interdisciplinary and global interests but refused to become a social theorist.

Braudel's treatise on the Mediterranean encouraged heroic efforts among his compatriots at *Annales.* Between 1956 and 1960, Pierre and Huguette Chaunu assembled a huge study of trade between Spain and the New World and surpassed even Braudel in scope by taking the Atlantic as its geohistorical focus. Chaunu's work also introduced more explicitly the notions of "structure" and "conjuncture" into *Annales* discourse. While a spatial and geohistorical emphasis had already led Febvre and Bloch to do regional studies, this research trend continued to be a central part of the group's work, not only in the efforts at a global history in the massive volumes of Braudel and Chaunu but also in more focused studies, for example, by Pierre Goubert on Beauvais, Immanuel Le Roy Ladurie on Languedoc, and Michel Vovelle on Provence.

The third generation of *Annales* historians that began to emerge in the 1960s and 1970s has produced many noteworthy individuals and studies, but perhaps the most famous is Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie. His various studies, beginning with his thesis on the peasants of Languedoc, continue Braudel's concern with geohistory but also expand it in a variety of directions not addressed very thoroughly by Braudel. These include a focus on mentalities (e.g., the inquisition and heresy in Montaillou), climatic influences, serial history (e.g., wine harvests), and in general, an effort to achieve the ideal of a "total history" originally called for by Febvre and Bloch. Le Roy Ladurie's book *Montaillou* also attempted to achieve the *Annales* goal of a total history through the intensive study of every aspect of a particular community. This approach resembled the earlier studies of whole communities done by both anthropologists and sociologists. Through the work of Le Roy Ladurie and his talent for reaching wider audiences, the history of *Annales* also became more widely known to the public; indeed, Ladurie became something of a celebrity, much as Foucault and others had done.

One of the major shifts in scholarly focus among the third generation of *Annales* historians has been a greater attention to the problem of "mentalities." This change was in part a reaction against the seemingly exclusive focus of second-generation *Annales* writers on an economically oriented geohistory. However, it was also prompted by the work of historians outside the *Annales* orbit, such as Phillip Aries and Michel Foucault, whose works on topics such as the family, death, and mental illness posed a challenge to the established *Annales* paradigm. Febvre's aforementioned work on the problem of unbelief in the sixteenth century was the outstanding study in this genre, and for a long time, very infrequently emulated. However, the renewed interest in mentalities took a different form. Febvre had focused on major literary figures and elite culture, while the new interest was in historical psychology, popular culture, and what might be called "mass mentalities."

Robert Mandrou, one of Febvre's early associates, had already moved in this direction in his 1961 study of early modern-French popular culture. However, the following *Annales* figures greatly expanded this effort: Jean Delumeau drew on psychological theories to write his history of sin and fear in early modern Europe. Others, such as Georges Duby and Michel Vovelle, introduced Marxian ideas about ideology into *Annales* discourse. Jacques LeGoff, the outstanding medievalist in the group after Bloch, wrote a large treatise on the development of the medieval image of purgatory. This focus on religious ideas was later extended by Delumeau to the study of the history of Christian ideas about paradise. Finally, the renewed study of mentalities was inspired, in part, by the work of "symbolic anthropology," with its focus on ritual, symbol, and collective definitions of reality. In this way, the work of *Annales* figures such as Georges Duby, Le Roy Ladurie, and others has been cross-fertilized by the writings of Marcel Mauss, Victor Turner, and Erving Goffman.

The historical focus of *Annales* has been primarily on medieval and early modern Europe. Contemporary society has been given much less attention. Many of their key concepts and methods—the *longue durée*, structure, conjuncture, A and B economic phases, and so on—were better suited to the study of the slow change or socioeconomic fluctuations of premodern agrarian societies. The work of Charles Morazé on *The Triumph of the Bourgeoisie* (1957) was, for a long time, the main exception to this generalization, although more recently, *Annales* figures such as Marc Ferro have written on topics such as the Russian Revolution from a standpoint congruent with the general *Annales* paradigm.

At the time of its inception, the *Annales* approach represented a departure from current practices in history and a new starting point. However, in succeeding as much as they have in defining a new style of historical research for the twentieth century, *Annales* and its approach have themselves become the historical establishment in France, and to a lesser degree and in varying ways, elsewhere in the world, where they have helped promote a new social history. The movement has left behind landmark works by Febvre, Bloch, Braudel, Le Roy Ladurie, and others, which will provide major reference points for historians and continue to be debated during this century.

At the same time, as the *Annales* school has grown, it has diversified its substantive focus. In many respects, its varied objects of investigation have come to resemble the specialties found in the adjacent field of sociology. Issues of the journal have addressed fields such as popular culture, the family, deviance, religion, and a wide variety of other topics, most of which continue to cross established disciplinary lines. In the process, it may have lost sight of at least one of its original objectives, the creation of a total history. This goal has not only been challenged by regional and topical specialization, but attempts have also been made to realize this objective in a different form. The large, synthetic works such as those of Bloch and Braudel have been supplemented by a more comprehensive coverage of analytically distinct subtopics as well as more thorough, if focused, studies on particular communities and regions. In the process, the meaning of a total history has shifted away from the sort of thing represented by Bloch's study of feudal society, or even Braudel's massive studies, and has perhaps come closer to what Le Roy Ladurie accomplished in his study of Montaillou. Whether this indicates a breakdown of one of the *Annales* original objectives or merely the prelude to more synthetic efforts remains to be seen.

— Donald A. Nielsen

See also Certeau, Michel de; Durkheim, Émile; Foucault, Michel; Wallerstein, Immanuel; World-Systems Theory

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ANOMIE

Anomie is a condition delineated by Émile Durkheim (1858–1917). It is closely related to his thinking on the collective conscience. The collective conscience, for Durkheim, represents the common morality, or more specifically, shared understandings, beliefs, norms, and values. In mechanical solidarity, it was strong and was a powerful binding force on people, but it has come to be weakened with the transition to organic solidarity. When this common morality is weakened, one of the things that happens is that people become unclear as to what is appropriate and what is inappropriate behavior; they feel a sense of normlessness and rootlessness. In other words, this lack of clear moral guidelines leaves people with a sense of anomie. Thus, anomie is a condition associated with organic solidarity and with the decline in the power of the collective conscience.

Durkheim's ([1897] 1951) most practical application of the concept of anomie is found in his classic study of suicide. Durkheim argued that there are four types of suicide—egoistic, altruistic, anomic, and fatalistic—which are determined by the individual's level of integration into and regulation by society. Anomic suicide is most likely to occur when the regulative ability of society is disrupted, when the level of regulation by society on the individual is reduced or is low. During such times, the collective conscience, or the level of collective moral restraint, is weakened, and the passions of the individual are allowed to simply run free with little or no constraint. These individual passions then come to rule the lives of individuals, leading them to a wide range of destructive actions, including suicide, that they might not otherwise commit.

A negative event, such as an economic depression, can lead to heightened levels of anomie. For example, losing one's job for a lengthy period of time, with little prospect of ever recovering it or one like it, can obviously lead to anomie. However, it is important to note that anomie is not precipitated only by negative events. "Positive" events can also lead to a sense of normlessness for individuals who experience them. For example, an economic boom can also radically alter one's sense of what is normal and hence leave one struggling to adjust to a new lifestyle and a new set of norms. Thus, because times are so good, one might change employers, jobs, or even careers, and such changes can also lead to anomie.

Durkheim viewed anomie, and the other problems of the modern world, as pathologies that are not permanent, but rather temporary abnormalities of the social world. Unlike the revolutionary attitude taken by many more radical theorists such as Marx, the far more conservative Durkheim was more concerned with "curing" society than he was in revolutionizing it. This role of a social reformer led Durkheim to propose a number of potential solutions to the social pathology of anomie. He believed that the most important of these involved the role to be played by occupational associations. He saw these associations as being able to bring workers, managers, and owners together into a single, unified group and thus help to restore the collective sense of a common morality. This strengthening of the collective conscience would lead to a decline in the condition of anomie and hence offer a potential "cure."

Robert Merton (1910–2003) was another prominent social theorist who employed and further developed the concept of anomie. Merton made a significant contribution to the structural functionalist approach to which he adhered by extending the idea of functions to also include dysfunctions (negative consequences). The idea of dysfunctions became particularly relevant to Merton in his analysis of the relationship between culture, structure, and anomie.

Merton defined culture in much the same way that Durkheim defined the collective conscience, as a system of norms and values that is present in society and is common to, and governs the behavior of, its members. He defined social structure as the organized system of social relationships in

which the members of a given society are involved. In addition, Merton was interested in the relationship between culturally determined ends and the structurally defined means to those ends. For Merton, anomie occurs when the means available to people make it difficult or impossible for them to achieve the cultural goals outlined by society. This tends to lead to a higher level of deviance among members as they are forced to find alternative (sometimes illegal) means to achieve the culturally prescribed goals. In this way, anomie, as represented by the disjuncture between social structures and cultural goals, is dysfunctional for society.

— Michael Ryan

See also Collective Conscience; Crime; Deviance; Durkheim, Émile; Merton, Robert

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ANZALDUA, GLORIA

Gloria Anzaldua (b. 1942) was among the first writers to critique academic feminism for constructing theory and practice based on white, middle-class, heterosexual experiences and for excluding the experiences of "other" women from its analyses. In *This Bridge Called My Back* (1981), she joined with other women whose voices and experiences had been ignored. This anthology initiated a call for feminists to create theory and practice that address the situations of all women: women of color, working-class women, lesbians, and aging women as well as white, economically privileged, heterosexual women. Only through inclusion can real social change emerge. Indeed, Anzaldua's writings and theorizing partly reflect her lived experiences as a lesbian Chicana.

Drawing on her own experiences as a Mexican American, lesbian woman, Anzaldua explores the "borderlands" of experience. She describes the splintered aspects of social identity and refers to borderlands as both physical locations (life in border towns, on the margins of society) as well as the social-psychological states experienced when one's identity is simultaneously embedded in oppositional racial, political, and historical relations. Her work calls for the constant deconstruction of racial and sexual categories in which binaries limit the imagination of agents. For example, she names binary categories such as white/black or male/female as despotic dualities that enable us to *see* only one or the other, as well as to *be* only one or the other. Her work offers a complex analysis of race, gender, class, and sexual politics that is grounded in her own life experiences and attempts to synthesize the fragmented aspects of social identity.

Anzaldua offers the physical, mental, and conceptual borders in a new, inclusive intercultural and intracultural analysis of identity: a physical and cultural location she calls "the new mestiza." This new location comprises racial, ideological, cultural, and biological "cross-pollination." Genetic streams and chromosomes cross, mix, and become not an inferior being, but a hybrid progeny she sees as more mutable and richer. In this sense, and from this physical location, an "alien consciousness" can emerge: a new mestiza consciousness that is the consciousness of the borderlands.

Through her work on borderlands and the new mestiza, Anzaldua critiques the way language has been used to suppress "other" discourses, particularly those groups whose locations and ways of experiencing the world are outside the Anglo/white/Western perspectives. To counter Eurocentric language, Anzaldua's work celebrates diversity and multicultural experiences, creating texts that integrate Spanish, Mexican, and Native American voices and dialects as legitimate.

Anzaldua argues that Chicanas are an eclectic cultural/racial/gendered blend of Indian, Spanish, black, and Mexican, who typically learn how to negate their Indian and black heritage and affirm only their Mexican-Spanish heritage. By doing so, Chicanas inadvertently reinforce the racial and cultural hierarchy prevalent in the West, in which light/European culture is conceptualized and privileged as more civilized, progressive, and rational than dark/Indian/black perspectives. For social theorists, Anzaldua's work is notable for emphasizing the importance of the researcher's life experiences as starting points and grounding points for all theorizing. Her work exemplifies embodied theorizing. She argues that it is only through the body that the social and physical world is experienced. The images and words we use and the stories we tell must arise from the flesh and bone of the body if they are to articulate a lived reality and offer any meaningful transformative power.

Anzaldua was born in 1942, in Rio Grande Valley, in South Texas. She received her bachelor and master's of art degrees from the University of Texas at Austin.

— Candice Bryant Simonds and Paula Brush

See also Essentialism; Feminism; Feminist Epistemology; Matrix of Domination; Postcolonialism

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AUGÉ, MARC

French anthropologist Marc Augé belongs to the generation of scholars who were trained in the 1960s in Paris—that is, the generation for whom the likes of Louis Althusser, Michel de Certeau, Gilles Deleuze, and Michel Foucault can be counted as teachers and crucial influences or antagonists, as the case may be. A prolific, witty, and complex author, Augé considers himself to be an anthropologist; but his lifelong project has been one of reinventing what it means to anthropology in the rapidly changing times we refer to as "postmodernity." While his work has only recently come to the attention of mainstream Anglo-American social theory, where it is generally read as part of a tradition of writing on the city and everyday life that includes the writings of Henri Lefebvre, Michel de Certeau, and Guy Debord, it has a very distinguished reputation in France.

Marc Augé's career can be divided into three stages, reflecting shifts in both his geographical focus and theoretical development: early (African), middle (European), and late (global). This obviously schematic picture is somewhat forced, because Augé never abandoned his interest in Africa and continued to write about it well into the European and global phases. However, it is nevertheless representative of an intellectual trajectory that begins with very localised ethnographic work and culminates in the elaboration of what he calls an "Anthropology for Contemporaneous Worlds." These successive stages do not involve a broadening of interest or focus as such, but rather the development of a theoretical apparatus able to meet the demands of the growing conviction that the local can no longer be understood except as a part of the complicated whole.

Augé's career began with a series of extended field trips to West Africa, where he researched the Alladian peoples and cultures situated on the edge of a large lagoon, west of Abidjan on the Ivory Coast. He spent close to two years there, between November 1965 and May 1967, researching almost every conceivable aspect of the culture and history of the region. The culmination of this endeavour is the masterly *Le rivage Alladian: Organisation et évolution des villages Alladian* (1969). As Tom Conley (2002a) has noted, this work marks a considerable advance on previous anthropological accounts of so-called peoples without history in that it factors

colonial history into its interpretation, along with an analysis of spirituality and kinship. The result, Conley (2002a) says, "is moving and almost cinematographic" (p. x).

The sequel, *Théorie des pouvoirs et idéologie: Études de cas en Côte d'Ivoire* (1975), follows three further field excursions to the Ivory Coast between 1968 and 1971. It was written in the shadow of the student protests of May 1968, which although witnessed only from afar, nevertheless register their effects on this work. "Through the study of ways that a subject can believe in sorcery Augé gathers a sense of the ideology of power as well as the elements that justify it and allow it to be transmitted and reproduced" (Conley 2002a:xii). Augé coined the term "ideo-logic" to describe his research object, which he defined as the inner logic of the representations a society makes of itself to itself. This interest in the "logic" of a particular culture shows the strong influence exerted by Michel de Certeau, who in the same period conducted his own researches into the "cultural logic" of everyday life. A third and final instalment in this series of studies was added in 1977, *Pouvoirs de vie, pouvoirs de mort.*

The second, or European, stage (*La traversée du Luxembourg,* 1985; *Un ethnologue dans le métro,* 1986, translated as *In the Metro,* 2002; and *Domaines et châteaux,* 1989) applies methods developed in the course of fieldwork in Africa. According to Conley (2002a), at least four aspects of this period of Augé's work appear to have been transposed from the Ivory Coast to Paris: (1) the paradoxical increase in the intensity of solitude brought about by the expansion of communications technologies; (2) the strange recognition that the other is also an "I"; (3) the "non-place," the ambivalent space that has none of the familiar attributes of place—for instance, it incites no sense of belonging; and (4) the oblivion and aberration of memory. The work in this period emphasises the anthropologist's own experience in a way that neither the earlier nor later work does. Augé does this by comparing his own impressions of these places with those produced by some of French literature's greatest writers: Balzac, Flaubert, Nerval, Proust, and Stendhal. What this comparison illustrates is the apparent insuperability of the gap between language and experience. Yet it is that very gap, he argues, that his anthropology must be able to close if it is to be of continuing relevance in contemporary society.

The third, or global, stage (*Non-Places,* 1995; *A Sense for the Other,* 1998; *An Anthropology for Contemporaneous Worlds,* 1998; and *The War of Dreams,* 1999), is an extended meditation on the disparity between observations made in the course of anthropological fieldwork in the first and the second stages of Augé's career. It is at least partially the result of his travels; for instance, his concept of the "non-place" refers to those spaces one typically encounters when travelling, such as airports, bus terminals, hotels, and so on, which one remembers only in the generic. Emblematic in this regard is Augé's marvellous account of the Paris

Métro. "The memorial form of *In the Metro* elegantly betrays the stakes of an enterprise that ties the topological dimensions of psychoanalytic anthropology that Augé had developed in the work on sorcery to the art of fiction" (Conley 2002b:83). Ultimately, his aim is to theorise globalisation as it is lived in properly global terms; it is also an attempt to reinvigorate the discipline of anthropology as a whole. To that end, he deploys a number of novel writing techniques, describing the synthetic results as "ethno-novels."

Augé is perhaps the first anthropologist to offer a theory of "global society" that isn't simply an extension of theories primarily developed to explain first-world conditions, such as Marxism or psychoanalysis (for comparable attempts in the field of sociology, think of the work of Bauman, Beck, and Giddens). In this respect, Augé's proposal (it remains a work-in-progress) not only matches the comprehensiveness of competing theories of a "global society," it goes a step further than they do and contrives its picture of the world from entirely original sources. Although it remains an open question whether or not Augé's "Anthropology for Contemporaneous Worlds" will prove to be of lasting interest, it can nonetheless be said with certainty that this combination of comprehensiveness and originality commands our attention today. Bold theoretical innovations of this nature are few and far between.

Indeed, contemporary anthropology has tended to shy away from both postmodernism and globalisation, believing, as James Clifford has tirelessly argued for the last decade and a half, that uneven economic development means that there isn't sufficient unity of experience at an anthropological level to speak in "global" terms. By the same token, even those theorists who do accept the idea of globalisation (Appadurai and Canclini), tend to read it in terms of ongoing dialogue between the first and third worlds, thus reinforcing the disunity of experience thesis by other means. As such, anthropology has not been able to produce a theory of society adequate to its globalised nature. Thus, Augé's position should not be compared with that of fellow postmodern anthropologists such as James Clifford, about whom Augé can find nothing positive to say. For Augé, reinventing anthropology means going back to the basic, defining experience of the anthropological experience, the encounter with the other—but not so as to find reasons not to engage with them, as certain strands of identity politics seem to demand, but to discover how the other *others* us.

— Ian Buchanan

See also Castoriadis, Cornelius; Certeau, Michel de

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AUTHORITY

Questions surrounding the topic of authority have long interested sociologists. Who has it? Where is it derived from? What kinds are there? How is it exercised?

Max Weber was interested in the concept of authority and how it related to what he perceived to be the increasing rationalization of society. He saw authority as the legitimate form of domination (there were illegitimate forms as well), which he defined as the "probability that certain specific commands (or all commands) will be obeyed by a given group of persons" (Weber [1921] 1968:212). He outlined three basic types of authority: traditional, charismatic, and rational-legal. Traditional authority is based on a historical precedent and the idea that one should rule because of a long-standing belief system. Charismatic authority is derived from the extraordinary skills or characteristics of the leader, or at least the perception of them by followers. Rational-legal authority, the one most interesting to Weber, is possible only in the modern world and is based on a set of rational rules that are formally enacted. This type of authority represents the most highly bureaucratized, and its increasing presence speaks to Weber's theory of the increasing rationalization of society.

A conflict theorist interested in issues of authority was Ralf Dahrendorf (1959). He argued that authority was derived from social positions, rather than the characteristics

of individuals. In particular, Dahrendorf was interested in the conflicts between these macrosociologically determined social positions. Authority, to Dahrendorf, implied both superordination and subordination. Hence, those who are in positions of authority rule because of the expectation of their positions and those around them, not because of any internal personal characteristics. Since authority is found in the position, however, those who do not comply with role expectations are subject to scrutiny and removal.

Dahrendorf further argued that authority is not a constant. In other words, a person who possesses authority in one time or place may not possess authority in a different time or place. Furthermore, any relationship of authority is composed of exactly two interest groups. Those with authority seek to maintain things the way they are, while those lacking in authority seek change. Consequently, any position of authority is always at risk of being overthrown.

— Michael Ryan

See also Conflict Theory; Dahrendorf, Ralf; Herrschaft (Rule); Power; Rationalization; Weber, Max

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